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I develop a dynamic model of social con
ict whereby manifest grievances of the poor
generate the incentive of taking over political power violently. Rebellion can be an equi-
librium outcome depending on the level of preexisting inequality between the poor and
the ruling elite, the relative military capabilities of the two groups and the destructiveness
of con
ict. Once a technology of repression is introduced, widespread fear reduces the
parameter space for which rebellion is an equilibrium outcome. However, I show that
repression{driven peace comes at a cost as it produces a welfare loss to society.
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11 INTRODUCTION
In 1993 president Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi, the rst Hutu president after independence
from Belgium in 1962, was assassinated by Tutsi extremists. Ndadaye's death ignited an
uprise of Hutu peasants against the Tutsi elite. The Burundi military reacted by massacring
Hutu civilians. In just over a year, between October 1993 and December 1995, more than
100.000 people including women and children were killed, mostly by government security
forces (State Department, 1996). In 1996 the Tutsi regained full control of the government
after the coup of Pierre Buyoya. A peace agreement was signed in Arusha in 2000.
Mass killings by government forces seeking to contain popular uprises were also conspicuous
in neighbors Rwanda (in 1994) and Congo (1997) as well as in Afghanistan (1998) and Sudan
(2003). Other examples of repression-enforced peace despite clear reasons for widespread
grievance include Russia under Stalin and Iraq before the 2003 invasion. More recently Robert
Mugabe reportedly jailed without trial thousands of alleged "enemies" of the government and
human rights activists while trying to hold to political power in Zimbabwe. Historically there
have been many societies in which leaders facing political opposition violate civil and political
rights of large numbers of citizens. Violations include systematic elimination by murdering
or disappearance, as well as torture and illegal imprisonment.
The technology of repression seems to be an eective instrument of appeasement. Eck and
Hultman (2007) present a new dataset on one-sided violence against civilians. The authors
nd that while government violence is only half as frequent as violence by rebel groups,
whenever there is violence by the government it generally takes the form of mass killings. So
state institutions{such as the army, the police and intelligence services- are more deadly than
armed opposition groups when they are repressive, especially in the case of autocracies.
Civil war and repression have been widely studied by economists and political scientists.
2However by and large these have been analyzed as separate phenomena.1 Notable exceptions
are the models by Acemoglu and Robinson (2001 and 2005) and Beasley and Persson (2009) as
well as the empirical analysis of Collier and Rohner (2008). Beasley and Persson (2009) study
the interaction between civil war and repression and show that there is a natural ordering
between peace, repression and civil war. The present paper is closer in spirit to Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001) and Collier and Rohner (2008) as the technology of repression suppresses
the threat of rebellion. I develop a dynamic model of rebellion and repression when there
are manifest grievances that encourage a fraction of the population to change the political
status quo. In the benchmark case, where no repression is allowed, I show the conditions
under which the poor rebel against the ruling elite. Whether there is rebellion or peace
depends on the initial inequality between the two groups, their relative military power, and
the destructiveness of con
ict. There are two reasons why rebellion can happen in the model.
Pure rebellion may occur if con
ict is anticipated not to destroy a large share of resources
and the elite does not have incentives to expropriate the poor. But the poor might also rebel
if they anticipate that the elite will try to expropriate them.
Once the model is extended so that the elite can make use of a repression technology to
suppress uprising by the poor, the "peaceful equilibrium" survives for a larger parameter
space. However, repression-enforced peace comes at the cost of reducing the aggregate welfare
of society, and I show that the welfare loss is proportional to the intensity of repression.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model which
is based on the dynamic framework by Acemoglu and Robinson (2005), and describes the
conditions under which the poor rebel against the ruling elite, both for Markov Perfect and
Subgame Perfect Equilibria. Section 3 introduces the technology of repression and shows that
if it induces enough fear, it is more likely that the poor refrain from mounting a rebellion,
1Studies focusing on the incidence of civil war include Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe
ler
(2004). The case of one-sided violence by the government has been studied by Eck and Hultman (2007).
3even if they have the incentive to do so in terms of the key parameters: inequality, relative
military power and con
ict destructiveness. Section 4 looks at the social welfare both with
and without repression and Section 5 concludes.
2 BENCHMARK MODEL
2.1 Set up
There is a continuum of size 1 of individuals, which is divided in two groups: the elite and
the poor. The elite constitute a fraction  of the population, with 1    being the fraction of
poor, which is assumed to be more numerous ( < 1=2): In spite of being the minority the
elite are assumed to have more political power. This re
ects the fact that richer groups are
more able to capture the political apparatus or manipulate the results of the elections. It
may also be the case that, being less numerous, the elite are more likely to solve the collective
action problem (Olson, 1965). Indeed, as in the model of social con
ict of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), the failure of the poor to solve the collective action problem at any point
in time will be a key element here.
The model is dynamic. Every individual in this economy wants to maximize the present






were, E0 are the expectations based on the information available at t = 0;  2 (0;1) is the
discount factor and yt is income in every period. Unlike other dynamic models where the
discount factor is xed, this is a model where repression-driven fear can update the way
individuals value the present, so  will also play a key role here.
4I assume that all individuals within the same social group are the same and so i only refers
to whether a person belongs to the elite or the poor: i 2 fe;pg: This simplication allows
me to treat the game as one between only two players, no individual can be pivotal in this
model. Still, to make explicit that decisions are taken at the individual level I will denote
payos in per capita terms.
The income of each individual is equal to the per capita share of the total pie that her group
receives in every period. This share depends on the relative political power of the group
the individual belongs to. Let  > 1
2 be a measure of the political power of the elite, with












where R are the total resources to be distributed. It is clear that, for a given share of the
population, the more powerful the elite are, the richer ever elite member will be.2 Resources
in this economy are distrubuted to social groups according to their relative political power.
In this sense  parametrizes the level of inequality in this society. Because the poor are the










, the poor have a
constant desire to change the resource allocation outcome. I assume that, because the elite
cannot commit ex-ante to redistribute resources towards the poor, the allocation of resources
2Building on classic ideas by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1996) and Grossman
and Helpman (1996), Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) illustrate a number of ways how the elite can be more
powerful in a democracy. For instance, in a probabilistic voting setting, if the elite are less ideological than
the poor they will be more likely to be swing voters and hence more likely to get higher redistribution towards
them. In addition, redistribution may be in
uenced by campaign contributions and the elite have more
resources to outbid the poor and may also be better organized to conduct lobbying activities.
5can only be changed by force.3 So, even if the `de jure' political power favors the elite, the
poor can have `de facto' power and organize a rebellion to attempt the appropriation of R .
Thus, the per-period payos in (1) are only relevant for periods of peace, P (dened as the
absence of violence by either the poor or the elite).
In contrast, let (rp;re), the probability that the elite appropriates by force the resources,
be a function of the decision by the poor of whether to launch a rebellion or not: rp 2 f0;1g
(with rp = 0 indicating that the poor refrain from rebelling) as well as the decision by the elite
of whether to ght back the rebellion: re 2 f0;1g:4 Naturally, 1 ((rp;re) is the probability
that the poor succeed in appropriating all the resources. I assume that (rp = 0;re = 1) = 1
and (rp = 1;re = 0) = 0:
In addition, let W be an indicator on whether ght occurs, W = 1   P = maxfrp;reg = 1:
Since violence is costly for society, if W = 1 a fraction  of the resources under dispute will
be lost leaving only (1 )R available for appropriation. Thus the per-period payos in time
of violence are:
ye









But the poor cannot launch a rebellion any time they want. They rst have to overcome
potential collective action problems inherent with the fact that coordination into rebelling
is dicult to achieve. This coordination can be achieved for reasons like negative income
shocks (Miguel et al., 2004) or some sort of political twist, like the raise of a charismatic
leader (Roemer, 1985). In this model coordination will only be achieved when the payo
3The inability to commit has been identied by the rational choice literature as the key determinant of
social con
ict in the presence of disagreement about the dsitribution of the social surplus. See for example
Fearon (1995), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Powell (2006).
4Alternatively  can be interpreted as the share of resources that the elite appropriates in war.
6from appropriation makes it attractive to rebel. Let  then take on two values fl;hg.
When the proportion of resources destroyed if there is violence is low ( = l), what is left
for appropriation is high and rebellion is more attractive. In contrast when violence-driven
destruction is high ( = h), rebellion will be less attractive. Hence one can think of  as a
state variable that summarizes the threat of rebellion.
Let q be the probability that the threat of rebellion is high (i.e., the rate of destructiveness
is low): q = Pr( = l): Hence (1   q) = Pr( = h) is the probability that the threat
of rebellion is low (because a high share of the resources available for appropriation will be
lost).
Let   denote the innitely repeated game described above. The timing of the game within a
period t is as follows:
1. Nature moves rst and sets t = fl
t;h
t g with Pr(t = l
t) = q




3. The elite observe if a rebellion is mounted and decide whether to ght back or not:
re
t = f0;1g
4. Payos are realized5
5Notice that the present model has several dierences with the dynamic framework introduced by Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001) {AR{. Notably, in contrast to AR's framework, in this model both the poor and the
elite exert violence. Moreover events are swapped in the present model with respect to AR's framework, as
rebellion takes place rst and the response of the incumbent occurs later.
72.2 Equilibrium
I rst solve the model by looking at Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE). MPE are a subset
of Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) where actions at any point in time t do not depend
on the history of the game, but only on the current state of the system. Hence, in this
model the state t contains all the payo-relevant information: given the actual opportunity
of rebellion each party plays the best strategy for itself irrespective of past promises or how
the game was played before. In this sense, focusing on MPE strategies emphasizes potential
commitment problems since what matters for decisions at any point in time are only current
incentives.6
In the next subsection I will illustrate the nature of the commitment problem and look at
the SPE. By doing so, I show that allowing for non-Markovian strategies does not produce
fundamentally dierent results.
Denition (Markov Perfect Equilibrium) Let p = frpg be the action taken by the
poor who, after observing the current state , decide on launching a rebellion or not: rp :
fl;hg ! f0;1g. Similarly e = freg is the action taken by the elite that consist of a
decision to contest the rebels or not, where this decision is contingent on the current action
of the poor who move before the elite in each period: re : fl;hg  f0;1g ! f0;1g: A MPE
is a strategy combination fe p;e eg such that e p and e e are best responses to each other for
all :
Before proceeding I make two assumptions, neither of which is crucial for the equilibrium
outcome but make the analysis simpler:
Assumption 1 Assume that h = 1; so that there is a state in which violence destroys all
the resources available. In such case rebellion is not attractive at all. To see this note that
6For a complete description of the properties of MPE see Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, Chapter 5).
8when h = 1 the stage payo to the poor is 0 if there is violence and
(1 )R
(1 ) if there is not.
So the poor will not want to rebel when  = h: More formally: rp( = h = 1) = 0:
Assumption 2 The state  only 
uctuates after periods of peace. It ceases 
uctuating
once W = 1 so that t = t 1(W = 1):
2.2.1 High-threat state
I start by analyzing the stage-subgame when  = l: This is the high rebellion threat state,
where violence destroys a low share, l; of the resources.
Let V i(rijr i;) be the value for group i of her decision ri 2 f0;1g given the decision of the
other group, r i 2 f0;1g; an the state  = fl;hg:
Solving the game by backward induction, I start by showing the elite's best response when
the poor's action is to rebel, rp(l) = 1: The value for elites of ghting back a rebellion when















where (re = 0;rp = 1) = 0: Here, V e(0j1) is the continuation value: Because today W = 1
(since rp = 1) by Assumption 2 the state stops 
uctuating. Tomorrow's value for the elite
will recur, and it is discounted by : Since  2 (0;1),  = 0 implies:
V e(0j1;l) = 0 (4)
9Hence, since V e(1j1;l) > V e(0j1;l);
Remark 1 Assume  = l so that the threat of rebellion is high: If the poor rebel the elite is
better o ghting back, re(rp = 1;l) = 1
In contrast, if the poor do not rebel in the high threat state, rp(l) = 0, the value for the















qV e(0j0;l) + (1   q)V e(rej0;h)
i
(6)
Since the state 
uctuates after periods of peace, the continuation value [qV e(0j0;l)+(1 
q)V e(rej0;h)] depends on the future realization of : With probability q the high threat (low
destructiveness) state recurs and with probability (1   q) it shifts to the low threat state.
The value for the elite in the latter state depends on the best response re given rp(h) = 0:
Since h = 1 it turns out that the elite will always prefer not to ght in the low threat state.













qV e(rejrp;l) + (1   q)V e(0j0;h)
i
(8)










Whether the elite attacks or not when the poor refrain from turning violent in the high threat
state depends on what option gives them a higher value. From equations (5) and (9) it is
clear that V e(0j0;l) > V e(1j0;l) if and only if:
 > 1   l:
Remark 2 Assume  = l so that the threat of rebellion is high: If the poor do not rebel the
elite will reciprocate as long as  > 1   l. If however  < 1   l then the elite will attack.
Thus, in deciding whether to turn violent given that the poor remain peaceful the elite
compares between the share of the total revenue it can get under peace, , and the share
that survives destruction if con
ict occurs, 1   l: Recall that  parametrizes the level of
inequality. Remark 2 suggests that for a given destructiveness of con
ict the greater the
inequality the less incentive will have the elite to contest violently the low resource share of
the poor.
The poor take into account the best responses of the elite{summarized in Remarks 1 and 2{to
decide whether or not to rebel when  = l: Combining Remarks 1 and 2, when  < 1   l,
the elite will attack regardless of whether the poor rebel or not. The poor take this into
account and compare V p(1;1;l) and V p(0;1;l) to make their decision. While remaining
peaceful will leave them with a value of zero, the payo from launching an rebellion is:
V p(1;1;l) =




(1   )(1   l)R
(1   )(1   )
(10)
11which is strictly positive so  < 1   l is a sucient condition for the poor to rebel and the
elite to ght back.
Lemma 3 (Rebellion anticipating expropriation by the elite) Assume  = l so that
the threat of rebellion is high. Assume further that  < 1   l so that the elite get a larger
share of resources if they attack the peacefully-behaved poor than if they reciprocate peace.
Anticipating this the poor will rebel as they are better o doing so than remaining peaceful.
Then rp(l) = re(l) = 1
However  < 1 l is not a necessary condition for a violent equilibrium to take place.
Lemma 4 (Pure rebellion) Assume  = l so that the threat of rebellion is high. Assume
further that  > 1 l so that it is not worthwhile to the elite to attack the peacefully-behaved
poor. Then:
 rp(l) = re(l) = 1 If l  
 rp(l) = re(l) = 0 If l > 
where  = 1   1 
1 
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 4 says that in the high threat state, when the level of inequality is such that they
can get a greater share of the total resources under peace, the poor will rebel as long as war
doesn't waste too much resources. If this is the case the elite will ght back. But when
war is destructive enough both the poor and the elite will remain peaceful. Note that the
critical value of destructiveness  depends positively on the level of inequality () and in
the probability that the poor appropriates all the resources violently (1   ).
122.2.2 Low-threat state
Let's now look at the stage-subgame where  = h; and by assumption 1, rp(h) = 0:
Recall from (7) and (8) that V e(0j0;h) > V e(1j0;h) = 0 and the elite will never attack the
poor in the low-threat state. Hence we have:
Lemma 5 (Destruction-enforced peace) Assume  = h so that the threat of rebellion
is low. Then rp(h) = re(h) = 0:
Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 fully characterize the MPE of the innitely repeated game  :
Proposition 6 There is a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, fe p;e eg; of the innitely
repeated discounted game  . Let  be dened as in Lemma 4. In in equilibrium:
I. When  = l :
1. If  < 1   l; then rp = re = 1
2. If  > 1   l :
 If l   then rp = re = 1
 If l >  then rp = re = 0
II. When  = h then rp = re = 0
Figure 1 describes the parameter space that characterizes de equilibrium of the benchmark
scenario. In the low destruction (high rebellion threat) state, when the share of the state
revenue the elite can grab is bigger under violence ( < 1   l) then the poor anticipate an
elite's aggression and will always launch a rebellion. The elite in turn will always ght back
(rebellion anticipating expropriation by the elite, area A in Figure 1a). But when peace is
more protable than violence for the elite ( > 1   l), the poor will only rebel when the
13destructiveness of violence is lower than the threshold . If the rebellion is carried out the
elite will ght back (pure rebellion, area B). On the other hand, if such threshold is not met
( < ), then both the poor and the elite will remain peaceful (destruction-enforced peace,
area C).
In turn, in the high destruction (low rebellion threat) state the poor will not revolt and the
elite will not turn violent either.
<Figure 1 about here>
That is, in a dynamic setting, the ability of the poor/elite to restrain from ghting (i.e,
the credibility of their promises) depends on the future state of the system {which fully
determines the allocation of de facto political power{. If the probability q of a high threat
state is high the poor are likely to have (de facto) power in the future so any promises made
today not to ght are not credible and the elite prefers to attack (re = 1) when it's not
attacked (rp = 0) to secure control thereafter over all the resources.
I will now show that allowing for non-Markovian strategies by focusing on subgame perfection
instead does not produce fundamentally dierent results.
2.3 The role of promises in sustaining peace
The inability to commit has been identied as the key determinant of social con
ict in
the presence of disagreement about the distribution of the social surplus (see Fearon, 1995
and Powell, 2006 amidst other authors). In this subsection I start by illustrating how the
commitment problem arises in this model: the elite cannot commit to reciprocate a peaceful
initiative by the poor irrespective of the state of the system and hence the poor cannot
commit not to rebel when there is the opportunity to do so and the rebellion is protable.
Then I show how looking at non-Markovian strategies can overcome the inherent inability
14to commit only partially, so that the spirit of Proposition 6 remains even if one looks at the
SPE.
The ability of the elite to reciprocate peace depends of the state of nature. Recall from (12)
and (7) that If  = h then V e(0j0;h) > V e(1j0;h) = 0 and hence it is in the best interest
of the elite not to attack the poor in the low-threat state.
However, if  = l whether or not re(rp = 0;l) = 0 depends on the share of revenue the elite
can get if they attack, 1 l, vis-a-vis the share they can get if remaining peaceful, which is in
turn given by their political power, : From (9) and (5) we have that V e(0j0;l) > V e(1j0;l)
if and only if  > 1 l: If that is the case then peace will be reciprocated but if the inequality
does not hold then it is not in the best interest of the elite to reciprocate peace in the high-
threat state and any promise of doing so is not credible.
Hence if  = l and  < 1   l the elite cannot commit not to reciprocate peace, re(rp =
0;l) = 1, so in turn the poor cannot commit not to launch a rebellion given that V p(1;1;l) >
V p(0;1;l) = 0.
Now I turn to the analysis of SPE. Since the MPE solution concept abstracts from the history
of the game, past promises are not taken into account and all that matters for current decisions
is the current realization of the state of nature. In this way MPE emphasizes the inability
to commit not to ght. In turn the SPE solution concept does take into account how the
game was played so promises do play a role. The question is to what extent these are enough
to make peace sustainable. Alternatively, the question is to what extent the MPE solution
concept bias the results towards ghting rather than peace. As it turns out, this bias is
very small, and the essence of Proposition 6 lingers in the sense that war will happen in the
high-threat state as long as it's destructiveness is below a critical threshold, l < :
To illustrate this, suppose the elite and the poor promise not to ght regardless of the
state of the system and this promise is reciprocated and supported by the threat of future
15punishments. Under what conditions can this be an equilibrium? The payo of the poor
if they stick to the promise is equal to the present value of remaining peaceful for ever:
V p(0;0;) =
(1 )R




(1   )(1   )
However, if they deviate and rebel they will get:
V p(1;1;l) =
(1   p)(1   l)R
(1   )(1   )
which captures the idea that rebellion can only happen in the high-threat state and that any
deviation from the promised behavior will be punished for ever after. Hence the poor will
keep the promise as long as V p(0;0;) > V p(1;0;l) which implies: (1   p)(1   l) < 1   
or l > : Note that this condition is identical to part I-2 of Proposition 6.
In turn, the elite promise to reciprocate peace under the threat of being punished forever
















where the rst term gives the one-time-only value of defection and the second is the present
discounted value of future reprisals. Hence elite will renege from their promise if:
 < (1   l)[1   (1   p)]
Thus we have:
16Proposition 7 There is a unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, fb p;b eg; of the innitely
repeated discounted game  . Let  be dened as in Lemma 4. In in equilibrium:
I. When  = l :
1. If  < (1   l)[1   (1   p)]; then rp = re = 1
2. If  > (1   l)[1   (1   p)] :
 If l   then rp = re = 1
 If l >  then rp = re = 0
II. When  = h then rp = re = 0
This proposition is equivalent to Proposition 6 with the only dierence that when looking
at Markovian strategies the condition condition for  is  < (1   l) instead of  < (1  
l)[1   (1   p)]. Note that (1   l)[1   (1   p)] < (1   l) because (1   p) > 0: So once
we allow for non-Markovian strategies we have survival of peace for a larger set of parameter
values (area C0 > C, see Figure 2). That is, promises can go some way toward solving
commitment problems but the underlying commitment problem will remain. So there is a
limited ability to keep peace promises and the spirit of Proposition 6 applies also to non-
Markovian strategies (Proposition 7).
<Figure 2 about here>
3 Repression
Turning back to the focus on Markovian strategies I now introduce a simple extension to
the benchmark model. Suppose that, in addition to contesting the rebellion, the elite can
17use repression to punish a rebellion attempt. Repression is dened as one-sided indiscrimi-
nate violence by the incumbent to hold political power, eectively reducing the challenge by
the opposition. It includes extra-judicial executions and political murder, illegal jailing and
torture. Such unmeasured repression is common in weakly institutionalized states that ex-
perience a rebellion threat. The purpose of indiscriminate repression is to generate a general
climate of fear in order to meet a particular political objective. Fear is widespread because,
beyond the victim, repression persuades a much wider audience.
I model this fear in a reduced-form way: in the face of repression (say mass killings) the poor
assign a higher value to the present relative to the future. Hence, the discount factor of the
poor under repression is b ; which I assume lower than the benchmark : Alternatively, in
the context of dynamic games one can think of  as the probability of surviving to the next
period t + 1: Under this interpretation repression can be thought as reducing the survival
probability for the average poor.
Let then b  <  be the discount value for the poor when there is repression. Let  0 denote
the new innitely repeated game. The poor and the elite play now the same game as before,
but with the following exception:
Assumption 3 Assume the elite only use repression after periods of violence. That is,
repression in t will not happen if Wt 1 = 0:
The timing of the game within a period t is as follows:
1. Nature moves rst and sets t = fl
t;h
t g with Pr(t = l
t) = q




3. The elite observe if a rebellion is mounted and decide whether or not to ght back:
re
t = f0;1g
184. If Wt = maxfr
p
t;re
tg = 1 then the elite will launch a repression campaign
5. Payos are realized
Proposition 8 There is a unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, fe p;e eg; of the innitely
repeated discounted game  0. Let  = 1  
(1 )(1 b )
(1 )(1 ); in equilibrium:
I. When  = l :
1. If  < 1   l; then rp = re = 1
2. If  > 1   l :
 If l   then rp = re = 1
 If l >  then rp = re = 0
II. When  = h then rp = re = 0
The proof of Proposition 8 follows the same steps than that of Proposition 6 (see appendix),
with b  as the discount factor for the value of the poor when Wt = 1:
Note that because of the assumption b  <  it follows that  < . This implies that in
the presence of repression the violent equilibrium rp = re = 1 when  > 1   l (that is
pure rebellion) is more dicult to achieve as it is necessary a realization of  such that the
resources left over after war are bigger than in the case without repression (area B00 < B, see
Figure 3). That is, in this model (the threat of) repression makes peace more likely (area
C00 > C) and thus elite members can continue appropriating a bigger share of the resources
R
 every period at the expense of the poor who receive only
(1 )R
(1 ) ; with  > 1
2 > . In
addition it is worth noting that
@
@b  > 0; which implies that the intensity of repression
(and thus the gap between  and b ) is also positively related with the hazard of peace (C00
increases as  reduces whit lower b ). More repressive incumbents are more likely to repress
rebellion attempts.
19<Figure 3 about here>
4 Welfare
The main result of the model described above is that the violent equilibrium, rp = re = 1,
is less likely to occur when there is a repressive elite than in the absence of the repression
technology. This is because when indiscriminate repression is carried out the poor is less
willing to turn violent unless their payo from doing so is suciently large to oset the
higher probability of getting killed. Hence, the realization of  needs to be small enough
such that most of the resources under dispute survive destruction (and the rebellion threat
is suciently high). Peace is then more likely when there is repression, but this occurs at a
cost. In addition to the fact that repression involves massive assassination and thus its threat
enforces a fear-based peace, the total welfare in this scenario shrinks compared to a scenario
in which repression is absent. To see this I dene Social Welfare (SW) as the sum of the
value of all the elite members and the value of all the poor.
To simplify the analysis I assume that  > 1   l and that l   <  so that the
Markov Perfect equilibria described in propositions 6 and 8 can be reduced to the following
statement:
Proposition 9 If  = l, then rp = re = 1: But if  = h, then rp = re = 0:
So a rebellion will be launched {and it will also be contested{whenever the state is such that
destructiveness is low and hence the threat of rebellion is high. On the other hand there will
be no violence by neither group under the low threat state. Then, total welfare will be given
20by:
SW = q[V e(1j1;l) + (1   )V p(1;1;l)]
+(1   q)[V e(0j0;h) + (1   )V p(0;0;h)] (11)
where the state is l with probability q and h with probability (1   q), and the value
functions V e() and V p() are summed-up across all elite members, ; and all the poor,
(1   ); respectively.
Expressions for V e(1j1;l) and V p(1;1;l) are given respectively by (3) and (10). Recall from
(8) that V e(0j0;h) depends on the continuation value if the state shifts to l : V e(rejrp;l):






qV e(1j1;l) + (1   q)V e(0j0;h)
i
which using (3) becomes:
V e(0j0;h) =
R
 [1   (1   q)](1   )
h
(1   ) + qp(1   l)
i
(12)
Likewise, V p(0;0;h) is a function of the continuation value V p(rp;re;l) which under the
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21Recall that when repression is introduced in the game the discount factor for civilians is
b  <  whenever Wt = 1: This implies that:
V p(1;1;l) =
(1   p)(1   l)R
(1   )(1   b )
Substitution of this expression into (11) both directly and through the continuation value of
V p(0;0;h) yields a total Social Welfare (under repression, SWr) of:

















q(1   p)(1   l)
(1   b )
#
(15)
Note that (14) and (15) are equivalent if and only if b  = : Conversely, it can be shown
that SWr < SW as long as the assumption b  <  holds. Note also that the bigger the gap
between b  and ; the bigger the dierence between SW and SWr: Hence we have:
Proposition 10 i) Repression increases the probability of peace but reduces the total welfare:
SWr < SW; ii) The welfare loss is proportional to the intensity of the repression: @SWr
@( b ) < 0.
5 Conclusion
While rebellion and repression have been widely studied by social scientists they have an-
alyzed independently. I build on the dynamic framework to study political transitions by
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001, 2005) and develop a model of social con
ict whereby man-
ifest grievances give the poorer fraction of the population the incentive to challenge the
political power of a ruling elite. Allowing for both Markovian strategies and past promises
22I show that rebellion can be an equilibrium outcome depending on the parameters of the
model. Given a low destructiveness of the con
ict, a higher level of preexisting inequality
between the two groups increases the probability of rebellion. The chances of peace are also
reduced the greater the military capability of the poor relative to the elite. In the model,
the destructiveness of war is the state variable which determines whether the poor are able
to solve the collective action problem and rebel against the elite.
I then introduce a technology of repression whereby the elite is allowed to respond to rebel-
lion attempts with, say, mass killings of opposition members. The key assumption is that
repression makes the poor overvalue the present relative to the future, or alternatively the
probability of surviving to the next period of the average poor is lower in the presence of a
repressive incumbent. Under this scenario the peaceful equilibrium becomes more likely in
the sense that it survives to a larger parameter space.
Despite the fact that repression is positively related with the probability of peace, I show that
society as a whole is worse o in terms of welfare when indiscriminate repression is at hand.
Moreover, the welfare loss is proportional to the intensity of repression. This means that
given some reasonable assumptions a repression-induced peaceful society may be worse-o
than a society in which the poor manage to carry-out a rebellion.
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Proof. Recall from Remark 2 that if  > 1   l then V e(0j0;l) > V e(1j0;l). In addition,
Remark 1 implies that V e(1j1;l) > V e(0j1;l), so overall, when  > 1   l the elite will
ght back if attacked and remain peaceful if no rebellion is carried out. The poor take this
into account and decide whether it is in their best interest to turn violent or stay peaceful. In





+ [qV p(0;0;l) + (1   q)V p(0;0;h)]
where the continuation value in the low threat state has re(rp = 0;h) = 0 since V e(0j0;h) >
V e(1j0;h) = 0 which follows from comparing (8) and (7). Hence:
V p(0;0;l) =
(1   )R
(1   )(1   )
(16)
The poor will revolt as long as V p(1;1;l) > V p(0;0;l), a condition which is met as long
as the expected share of revenue after rebellion is greater than the share they can obtain
by remaining peaceful, which is in turn determined by the political power of the elite, .
Formally,
(1   p)(1   l) > (1   )
Solving for , this implies that the poor will rebel (and the elite will ght back) when the
high state is such that the destructiveness of war is lower than a critical threshold: l  ;
with  dened as:
 = 1  
1   
1   p
Otherwise, if l > ; destructiveness is high enough to dissuade the poor not to rebel; a
choice that the elite will reciprocate.
267.2 Proposition 8
Proof. When repression is allowed, since the discount factor of the elite is unchanged,
V e(1j1;l) is still equal to
(1 l)R
(1 ) and V e(0j1;l) is still 0 as in equations (3) and (4) re-
spectively. Hence Remark 1 of the benchmark case holds in this scenario. Because V e(1j0;l)
and V e(0j0;l) from equations (5) and (9) are also unchanged, Remark 2 also holds.
However, the discount factor of the poor does change, becoming b  <  whenever there is
repression, which by Assumption 3 only happens after periods of violence. Hence V p(1j1;l)
changes to
(1 )(1 l)R
(1 )(1 b ) which is smaller than its previous value
(1 )(1 l)R
(1 )(1 ) since b  < .
The poor will revolt as long as V p(1j1;l) > V p(0j0;l). Because it does not involve re-
pression, the latter value remains unchanged and it is given by equation (16) in the previous
section of the appendix. Thus the poor will revolt as long as:
(1   )(1   l)R
(1   )(1   b )

(1   )R
(1   )(1   )
  
where  = 1  
(1 )(1 b )




Figure 1 relates the destructiveness of war under the low-threat state, µ
l, with the political power of the 
elite under peace, which is give by the level of inequality, λ (the maximum value the two parameters can 
take is 1) The negative-sloped line λ = 1-µ
l divides the parameter space in two. Area A describes the 
space in which rebellion occurs in anticipation of expropriation by the elite. This happens because the 
elite get a larger share of resources if they attack the peacefully behaved poor than if they reciprocate 
peace, λ < 1-µ
l.  Anticipating  this  the  poor will  rebel, as they are better off doing so than remaining 
peaceful (see Lemma 3). If the opposite is true, λ > 1-µ
l, whether war occurs or not depends on how 
destructive it is. If µ
l is larger than a threshold, µ*, which is in turn positively related with inequality (and 
the intercept of which depends on the probability, ρ, that the elite wins the war) then war will be avoided 
because it is too destructive (area C, see Lemma 5). If not, the poor will find it profitable to rebel and the 




Figure 2 shows how the Markov Perfect Equilibrium described in Figure 1 changes when looking at 
Subgame  Perfect  Equilibria.  What  changes  with  respect  to  Figure  1  is  the  condition  for  a  rebellion 
anticipating expropriation by the elite. This outcome becomes less likely (A’ < A) because the elite can 
now make promises not to expropriate if the poor refrain from attacking in the first stage of the game. 
This in turn increases the probability both of a “pure rebellion” outcome (B’ > B) and a destruction-





Figure 3 relates the benchmark scenario of Figure 1 with the case of repression. The useof the latter by 
the elite lowers the destructiveness threshold below which the poor have incentives to rebel, hence this 
outcome is less likely to happen (B’’ < B). This is because such threshold is now positively related with 
the discount factor of the poor, β
^, which is smaller than the benchmark. Notice that under this scenario 
C’’ > C, which implies that the peaceful outcome is now more likely. 
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